Police records show "99 units" lack department-wide mission, regulation, oversight | News | Pittsburgh | Pittsburgh City Paper

Police records show "99 units" lack department-wide mission, regulation, oversight

"This is a police tactic that carries a very high risk of citizen harm."

In 2010, CAPA High School student Jordan Miles was beaten during an altercation with three plainclothes "99-car" officers as he walked to his grandmother's house.

In 2011, 24-year-old Lawrence Jones was shot and killed after officers in a 99 unit stopped him for playing loud music in his car.

These incidents aren't the only issues with these Pittsburgh Police units. Known by their numeric designation, "99," the units feature plainclothes police officers patrolling in unmarked cars. They have also concerned community activists for several years.

Following the Miles incident, for example, the Citizen Police Review Board launched an investigation into 99 cars, and in December 2012, the board held a hearing on the subject.

At that hearing, Brandi Fisher, president of the Pittsburgh-based Alliance for Police Accountability, testified: "Being that the complaints you receive from ... the community are mostly because of the 99 cars, I think there needs to be something — some kind of way to gauge their effectiveness."

But despite regular controversy surrounding the program, to date there has been no overhaul of 99 cars, which are given more latitude to operate than other units.

According to information obtained by City Paper under the state's open-records law, there is no bureau-wide policy for 99 cars. Currently, five of Pittsburgh's six police zones have a 99 car. The scope and mission of the units varies from zone to zone, as do requirements and criteria for the officers selected for the detail. And without these guidelines, say law-enforcement experts and officials, more high-profile incidents are in the bureau's future.

"The problem with the 99-car tactic ... it is often used without appropriate forethought, it is not properly regulated or supervised, and the officers assigned are often not adequately trained in its proper application," says Pittsburgh-based attorney Timothy O'Brien, who has filed several civil lawsuits on behalf of clients who say officers in these units have violated their civil rights. "The unfortunate, predictable result from this stew of haphazard practices is far too often unnecessary injuries or even death inflicted upon innocent citizens."

However, changes could be in the works. The high-profile incidents involving 99 cars and conversations with the community have shaped how Pittsburgh's new Police Chief Cameron McLay plans to oversee the unit going forward.

"I came in with some real concerns about the 99 car," McLay says. Based on media reports, he said he was "picturing them functioning as a plainclothes jump-out squad. So I came in with the intention of reshaping that and being a little more dictatorial about how these cars are deployed."

As part of its public-records request, CP asked for all policies, objectives and mission statements regarding these undercover units; documentation on training and qualification requirements; documentation on arrests, search warrants, warrantless searches and use-of-force incidents connected with 99 cars; and demographic information for officers in 99 cars.

Responses to the request varied by police zone. While some of the city's zones sent only 99-car related documentation that already existed — including memos and daily activity reports — other zones submitted newly compiled information and statistics.

The city did not provide documentation from Zone 4's existing unit, which covers Oakland, Shadyside and Squirrel Hill.

No department-wide guidelines for 99 cars were provided, indicating that such guidelines do not exist. Instead, each zone defines the role of its unit. Chief McLay says that's not necessarily a bad thing.

"It originally was intended to be used as a discretionary resource for the zone commanders to deal with any number of problems that may be going on in the zones," McLay says.

In the North Side's Zone 1, for example, an August 2010 memo from zone commander RaShall Brackney to assistant chief Maurita Bryant explains that 99-car officers are to serve as "intel-liason officers," providing information on gang activity. They're also supposed to handle all drug-related complaints made to the mayor's 311 complaint line, or obtained by community-relations officers.

An August 2009 memo from then-Lt. Kevin Kraus says the Zone 5 unit (East End) focuses on "neighborhood crime issues," including "suppressing illegal narcotic activity, illegal firearms and violent crime."

Zone 2 Commander Eric Holmes, who oversees the Hill District, Strip District, Lawrenceville, Polish Hill and Downtown, provided a summary of his 99 unit that included recent activity. According to the summary, in 2014, the unit "acted in an operational support role for Zone Two uniformed officers ... as well as enforcement of ‘Quality of Life' crimes and other illegal activity."

Scott Schubert, the commander in Zone 6, which consists of the West End and South Hills, did not outline his 99 cars' mission. But he did provide reports detailing activities ranging from surveillance to traffic stops.

While McLay is unconcerned by the lack of uniform guidelines, critics say it can be problematic.

"There should be a bureau-wide policy," says retired Brentwood police chief Wayne Babish, chief investigator for the Allegheny County Solicitor's office. "That policy should include what officers are expected to do and what they should not do."

Zone 3, which covers the South Side and hilltop neighborhoods, provided no information on the mission of its 99 cars, but did provide a list of officers in the cars from 2007 to 2014. It also enumerated arrests and field contacts.

"There needs to be more transparency on what it is they actually do, who they actually report to," says the Alliance for Police Accountability's Fisher. "What are the policies and procedures that 99 cars have to follow if there [are] any, and if there's not, it's definitely necessary to have them."

Without a clear directive, experts say that 99-car officers often find themselves operating out of bounds. Babish says such a directive would include background requirements and training to deal with situations unique to a 99 patrol.

"Police officers actually want to be told what to do," says Babish. "For the majority of police officers, they will do what they are told to do. They just want to see something in black and white."

McLay says that over time, 99 cars in Pittsburgh seem to have evolved to focus on drug and weapons enforcement because those are the problems facing Pittsburgh neighborhoods. Rather than dictate what 99 units tackle, he says, he will focus on ensuring these officers make community residents feel safe and protected.

"The expectation I have is that the zone commanders are going to be receptive to the zone's community-policing needs," McLay says. "I made it clear that what I do not want to see is the use of 99s for what's known in the community as jump-out squads. My expectation is that they're doing a broad problem-solving approach as well as [addressing] this drug and gang violence."

Similar plainclothes units exist in other cities and experience similar issues. One issue is the frequency of traffic stops and the number of citizens injured after stops by plainclothes officers in unmarked cars.

"An undercover car should not be used to do routine traffic stops," says Beth Pittinger, executive director of the Citizen Police Review Board. "There are going to be occasions when they're going to have to stop a moving violation that's posing a significant threat. But as a matter of routine, no."

While an aggregate of traffic stops in Zone 6 was not provided, daily activity reports from 99 officers demonstrate a pattern of regular traffic stops from 2010 to 2012. In 2012, for example, 384 traffic stops were conducted. The 99 car in Zone 6 was disbanded at the end of 2012 "due to manpower constraints," Commander Schubert said in an August 2014 memo.

More recent statistics reveal that traffic stops remain a common practice by 99 cars. In 2013, the 99 unit in Zone 2 performed 131 traffic stops. As of August of this year, the Zone 2 unit had performed 37 traffic stops.

"You don't want unmarked cars pulling people over unless it's an absolute necessity," Pittinger says. "That's not their job. It's not an appropriate use of resources. And it can be a very dangerous practice not only for the civilians involved but for the officers."

State law doesn't prohibit plainclothes officers in unmarked police cars from performing traffic stops where there is an immediate threat. But their cars must be equipped with flashing lights or sirens. Still, even where 99 cars are legally allowed to perform traffic stops, the practice raises problems.

"Why would an unmarked detail be doing traffic stops?" Pittinger says. "And what's the nature of those stops? Faulty taillight or inspection sticker? What they're really looking for is a way to engage that individual."

Pittinger said traffic stops done by 99 cars could be pretextual stops, where a police officer detains a person for a minor infraction because he or she suspects that the person of a more significant crime.

"Pretextual stops: That's a traditional shady police practice," says Pittinger.

According to field-contact reports from Zone 6, 99-car officers initiate traffic stops for reasons ranging from broken taillights to loud music. In one 2012 report, 99 car officers ran a car's registration which came back "revoked for insurance cancellation." The passenger of the vehicle was arrested after officers say they found a bottle of prescription pills and heroin in the passenger's pocket.

While McLay says 99 officers should not be precluded from doing traffic stops, he too worries about pretextual stops.

"My preference is that if we make stops for drug activity that those stops are based on reasonable suspicion," McLay says. "I'm not a fan of pretextual traffic stops, where we stop you for a broken mirror when what we really want to talk to you about is that hand-to-hand exchange we just thought we saw. I'd much rather my officers be upfront."

Some 99-car traffic stops, such as the case of Lawrence Jones of the North Side, have not ended so smoothly. Jones was shot and killed after he was stopped for playing his music too loud.

"The police officers were in plainclothes," says O'Brien, the attorney who initially represented the victim's mother in a lawsuit. "The police did eventually identify themselves. But it was one of those cases where a relatively innocuous encounter ends with critical force by police."

According to court documents, two 99-car officers stopped Jones for violating the city's noise ordinance. After the officers stopped Jones and began questioning him, he started to drive away from the officers, hit a van and was shot by one of the officers, according to a lawsuit filed against the city.

The lawsuit alleged that inadequate training led to Jones' death. His mother, Evelyn Reese, contended that the police should not have made a traffic stop in plainclothes and an unmarked vehicle.

Reese's lawsuit alleged that with plainclothes units, the city and the police bureau have a policy of "deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of citizens ... resulting in citizens suffering unnecessary serious injury and/or death."

An undisclosed settlement between Reese and the city was reached earlier this month.

"It's always been our contention that these 99 cars are not used in the appropriate context," O'Brien says. "Our view is that this is a police tactic that carries a very high risk of citizen harm, and because of that it has to be closely regulated."

In the Miles case and other incidents, citizens say they ran from plainclothes officers because they didn't know who they were. The same has been true in traffic stops, and some wonder whether plainclothes officers conducting traffic stops causes confusion about their identity.

"That's reasonable and it makes complete sense to me," says McLay who plans to decrease the use of plainclothes for 99-car work. "I'm not sure why they need to be in plainclothes to be doing this work. I'm going to be watching very carefully to make sure the fact that they're in plainclothes isn't causing fear or problems in the community."

The lack of specific training for 99-car officers has also often been criticized. Like oversight, training varies by zone. According to documents, officers receive training in areas including: concealed weapons, drug paraphernalia, street gangs and traffic control. Other training includes "Top Gun training" — a drug-enforcement training course — and "Mexican Drug Cartels training." Other zones have no "written standard training requirements."

In addition, very little is known about the qualifications officers need to be assigned to a 99 car. In Zone 3, there are no "written qualifications for an officer to be assigned to the unit," acting commander Larry Scirotto said in an August 2014 memo. The same is true for Zone 1 and Zone 6.

In January 2007 in Zone 5, according to a memo by Lt. Reyne Kacsuta, an officer was recommended for the 99 car because of "good instincts when investigating drug users and dealers." Kacsuta recommended another officer because he was a "diligent officer who pays attention to details."

According to a 2013 memo from Zone 2 Commander Eric Holmes, officers interested in the 99-car unit "should have completed three years of service with the Bureau." Training certifications are also considered, according to the memo.

"You must seriously consider the background of police officers you assign to these cars," Babish says. "This should include psychological exams. Are they prepared to do this kind of work? You have to look at their disciplinary record."

McLay says he will continue to leave selection of 99-car officers up to commanders, but plans to implement mandatory training in search-and-seizure procedure. Newly appointed assistant chief Scott Schubert will be responsible for overseeing 99 cars.

"Putting people out there with insufficient direction, insufficient training, insufficient supervision is where people with the best intentions in the world are likely to make mistakes," says McLay.

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